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What’s next after Theresa May’s 
spectacular own goal? 
Michael Emerson 
his was meant to be a Brexit election to strengthen the Prime Minister’s hand. The result 
was precisely the opposite.  
Her management of the Brexit process has become a long sequence of own goals: quit 
the customs union and single market; watch EU agencies re-locate to the continent, including 
importantly for medicines and banking; banking jobs begin to relocate; science, research and 
academia see their interests harmed; the budget settlement prospect becomes a big new 
negative; the Irish border question threatens; immigration from the EU is already declining and 
various sectors from fruit-picking to the national health service are at risk. Moreover, the UK’s 
economic growth has slowed down and is now forecast to drop to 1% in 2018; the pound has 
lost 13% since the referendum; inflation is up; and consumer spending is down. The only solace 
available to Mrs May is that the Scots seem to be having second thoughts about independence. 
But this election was her biggest own goal yet. The credibility of her Brexit negotiation method 
is shattered. She thought the British people could be satisfied with slogans about “Brexit means 
Brexit”, or “getting the best deal for Britain”, and the now notorious “no deal is better than a 
bad deal”. Above all there was the failure to define and communicate a credible negotiation 
strategy. The Brexit White Paper of February 2017 contained serious contradictions, insisting 
that the UK should get ‘seamless’ market access while still leaving the customs union and the 
single market.   
What’s next? 
Mrs May has the Queen’s consent to carry on, since her party remains the biggest one in terms 
of the number of MPs. But a wide range of scenarios is now being discussed. Where does the 
will of the people now lie? According to a ‘Survation’ poll conducted on Saturday, June 10th, 
two days after the election, a majority of 49% believe that the Prime Minister should resign, 
versus 38% who think she should stay in office. The narrow 52-48% majority to leave in the 
referendum is now almost exactly reversed, with a 51-49% majority to remain. However a large 
majority do not favour holding a second referendum (55% against, versus 35% for). A 
substantial majority favour a ‘soft’ Brexit rather than a ‘hard’ one (47% soft, 36% hard).  
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But there are alternatives 
What the Brexit story is telling us so far, so it seems, is that anything could happen. Let us 
examine four scenarios, all following from the broad interpretation of the election result now 
being discussed in the British media, and confirmed by the Survation poll cited above, that the 
British people do not like the idea of a ‘hard Brexit’. The latter is variously interpreted as a range 
of possibilities from quitting the single market and the customs union, through to the ‘no deal’ 
with the default solution of allowing WTO membership to define future trade relations with the 
EU. At least four alternatives can be considered, as sketched below. 
1) Stay in the single market, but not the customs union. This would mean in effect joining the 
European Economic Area (EEA), for which the UK entirely qualifies, as long as it does a U-turn 
on accepting the continued jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 
and as long as all EEA member states agree to this arrangement. The EU member states might 
well accept, but the acquiescence of Norway, the major non-EU power in the EEA, cannot be 
taken for granted. The important advantage of this scenario is that there would be nothing to 
negotiate except the financial settlement. With the Article 50 guillotine due to fall in less than 
two years and with the risk of ‘no deal’ if the UK tries for a complex bespoke agreement, this is 
now a major point. 
2) Stay in the customs union as well as the single market. There are strong arguments for and 
against this option. First, it would avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic. It would also save important industries that rely on complex cross-channel supply 
chains, automobiles being the prime example (including BMW, Nissan and Toyota, with their 
plants in the UK). On the other hand, the customs union has serious inconveniences for 
economies that are not predominantly trading with the Union. Only about half of the UK’s trade 
structure is with the EU, and other half is with the rest of the world. The big disadvantage here 
is that the UK would have to follow the EU’s external tariff for its imports from the rest of the 
world, including its preferential deals (free trade agreements and other preferences). In the 
case of the EU’s many FTAs, the UK would be obliged to grant tariff-free access for its imports, 
but would have no guarantee of receiving a reciprocal benefit for its exports. That would 
require the UK to engage in bilateral negotiations with (say) Mexico with no guaranteed 
outcome. Mexico is a pertinent example since Turkey, which is in the EU’s customs union, has 
had to follow the EU’s concessions for its imports, but has not been able to persuade Mexico 
to reciprocate. There is also the argument, much used by Brexit advocates, that the UK could 
go ahead and make FTAs in the wider world ahead of the EU. First soundings with the US, India 
and Australia, however, suggest that this approach would be far from straightforward.   
3) Go seriously for a deep and comprehensive strategic partnership. This was in principle 
advocated in the Brexit White Paper, adding that the future trading relationship should be “as 
frictionless and seamless as possible”. But this was not translated into legally operational terms. 
Worse, it was muddled by also stating the intention to leave the single market and customs 
union, which made the whole proposal contradictory, or maybe just a reflection of the inability 
of the government to make up its mind. The easiest route for the Prime Minister now would be 
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to propose an agreement that would be said to build on the White Paper, while in content it 
would lie between the EEA (as for Norway and others) and the DCFTA models (as for Ukraine 
and others). It could be more than the DCFTA by assuring seamless continuity with single 
market law, but less than the EEA regarding dispute settlement and the CJEU. The DCFTA model 
here has primary recourse to WTO-type arbitration, and only limited recourse to the CJEU. The 
UK would clearly state, as also under both the EEA and DCFTA models, the wish to accede to all 
EU agencies and programmes open to non-member states, and to favour cooperation on 
foreign policy, security and terrorism, etc. Switzerland actually has a regime with the EU that is 
not so different in substance to the above, but this was negotiated progressively in several 
packages over approximately two decades rather than two years, and the EU has explicitly 
rejected the repetition of any such ‘cherry-picking’ approach. 
4) Abandon Brexit, revoking Article 50. This would be the most logical option; as President 
Juncker has said, “there is no good Brexit”. Indeed, all of the foregoing scenarios are second 
bests. Therefore, it is best to renounce Brexit before it is too late, but maybe it is too late. There 
are two problems here, – one legal-technical and the other political-fundamental – quite apart 
from the question of how it might be engineered politically in the UK.   
The first is whether legally the Article 50 declaration can be revoked. This question is currently 
heading towards the Court of Justice, via the Irish courts. But for the moment, no one seems 
to know.  
The second and more fundamental consideration is that the EU27 has moved on, from regret, 
to getting on with a future without the UK. Most clearly France and Germany are now preparing 
ideas for the EU to move ahead, for example towards a European Defence Union, with a 
dedicated operational HQ decided last week and the beginnings of a defence spending chapter 
in the EU budget. These symbolise the way forward for a more muscular foreign and defence 
policy, without the UK as spoiler.   
Conclusion 
These four scenarios probably contain all the main possibilities for a good or second-best 
resolution of the mess that the UK has created for itself. It is now for Mrs May or her successor 
to choose. Above all, there is the need for a clearly defined and operational strategy, capable 
of being negotiated in under two years, which is why one or another of the above templates 
could be so valuable. This would represent a major course correction, after speeches declaring 
that there is no existing model to rely on, which only magnified the uncertainties. The second 
course correction would be to transparently publish the chosen strategy, thereby permitting 
the British public to see what is going on and to evaluate it. Most importantly, it would avoid a 
repeat of the kind of political surprise and disruption that is now being observed.  
